

# The Role of Global Actors on the Failed Transition to Democracy in Egypt-

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### Abstract

The paper aims to roles of the global actors on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt. In this study, the negative political influence of powerful states on Egypt evaluated in terms of democracy. The current social inequality in the region continued to increase in the 2000s. Egypt's authoritarian leader were not able to establish the relations between state structures and citizens in the last decade. The global actors had crucial roles on the continuation the authoritarian regime in Egypt. They were easily able to get their demands from Hosni Mubarak. When the time was at the end of 2010, the popular uprising movements affected the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region deeply. Egypt was one of the most remarkable countries in the region where Hosni Mubarak ousted. The people in Egypt wanted to have a democratic rule in order to have solutions to the social inequality, favoritism, and corruption. Normally, the powerful global actors should have played positive role so as to enable democratic transition. The United States of America and the European Union needed a more proactive policy along with the acceptability of a democratic criteria. Unfortunately, external actors were silent in the following the process in the first place because they were caught unprepared for the Arab Spring and did not expect such a result. Later on, foreign powers supported the counter-revolution in Egypt when they saw that the things did not go as they would have liked. They expressed their support most clearly in the post-coup statements discussing military and financial issues.

**Keywords:** Egypt, democracy, Arab spring, transition, coup'd'etat, counter-revolution, Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

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## 1. Introduction

10 Throughout Egypt's history, there have always been global actors with weak positive  
11 political influence under the name of democracy promotion. They served for the authoritarian  
12 regime in the shape of economic grants in Egypt rather than promoting the democratization.  
13 Eventually, while supporting democratization in the country politically via huge amount of aids and  
14 grants, the global actors, the westerners and powerful regional countries abstained from criticizing  
15 the repressive policies the regime had over the opponents namely Muslim Brotherhood. Dictators'  
16 governance of countries with authoritarian regimes for many years has undoubtedly caused a rise in  
17 the longing for the democracy of the people of the region. In addition, institutional transformations  
18 in these countries cannot be achieved in the post-Cold War era. The existing social inequality in the  
19 region continued to increase after the 2008 crisis. The youth population, which is the most  
20 damaged class from this crisis, has started to uprising in order to get their rights. Authoritarian leaders  
21 of the region were not able to set up relations between state structures and their citizens. The  
22 reason for this was that the oil-rich countries of the region had state structures that did not need  
23 political institutions to provide representative justice. Some scholars like (Fortna and Huang, 2012:  
24 803; Abbasi, 2012: 9) claimed that "oil and democracy do not coexist in any part of the world." In  
25 the period of state-building, the purpose of Arabism is to function as glue, tribal system, kinship  
26 ties brought by feudalism, favoritism, and corruption which have emerged as the greatest obstacle  
27 to the development of democracy in the region. Countries and their leaders who were not very rich  
28 in terms of underground resources such as Egypt and Tunisia had provided economic benefits for  
29 regime pros with thanks to their sectarian relations. The development brought about by economic  
30 modernization led to an increase in corruption, and favoritism to the regime bias, which led to a  
31 more rigid authoritarian regime leading to the management style. Strong authoritarian regimes had  
32 continued to become stricter to the basic human rights violations. Yet, the political liberalization  
33 that should be expected as a result of the changing movements does not seem possible in the near  
34 future. The most important proof of the paradigm forgetting political liberalization, before the  
35 "Arab Spring", which was generally built on economic liberalization, was the rhetoric of popular  
36 movements. The reasons for the uprising in the region were not only the economic difficulties. The  
37 new generation of the Arab population is a more politically and pragmatically structured generation  
38 that uses technology better and is aware of the living standards of its peers in other geographies of  
39 the world. In this context, the European Union needs a more proactive policy along with the  
40 acceptability of a more active European Union in the perspective of the people of the region who  
41 are going to increase accordingly. Perthes (2011) stated about the reaction of the EU and USA to  
42 the 'Arab Spring' as;

43 The European Union and the United States, taken by surprise by the sudden outbreak of  
44 the Arab Spring, have had to accept their lack of influence over these revolutionary  
45 upheavals. They may assist or obstruct, but they cannot determine the course of events.  
46 This applies even to Libya. Without NATO's intervention, it would certainly have taken  
47 much longer to oust the Gadhafi regime. Whether Libya, however, remains divided or  
48 spirals into anarchy, whether the outcome will be a new dictatorship, some kind of tribal  
49 confederation or the emergence of a democratic system, will be decided by Libyans, not by  
50 Europe or NATO. If anything, the limited influence of Europe and the international  
51 community on the timing and progress of the uprisings is an advantage. Alongside their  
52 peaceful trajectory, the beauty of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions was that they were  
53 autochthonous; immune to accusations of foreign meddling, but having little influence is  
54 not the same as escaping all responsibility (p.73).

55 Therefore, it is imperative that Western states or institutions, which should not be  
56 forgotten, help with the election of the territorial rights, should not escape this responsibility. It is a  
57 fact that the western world has not taken as much responsibility for the arrival and settlement of

58 democracy and human rights. Transformation and changes may be risky. In this respect, European  
59 Union had been indifferent to taking part in contributing to the transformation of the region, and  
60 EU had not taken responsibility for democracy and civil liberties in the MENA. The most  
61 important factor that distinguishes the experience of revolution in Egypt from the ones that have  
62 existed before is that the external actors are intensely involved in the developments experienced in  
63 this process. Although many foreign actors were caught unprepared for the developments in Egypt  
64 when they engaged at a very low level in the early period of the revolution which started on the 25<sup>th</sup>  
65 January 2011, regional and global actors in the following period had crucial roles in the country's  
66 political developments by rapidly repositioning. The period in which this situation is most explicitly  
67 experienced is the period of counter-revolution. Global actors were silent in the following  
68 process in the first place because they were caught unprepared for the Arab Spring and did not  
69 expect such a result. Later on, foreign powers supported the counter-revolution in Egypt when they  
70 saw that the things did not go as they would have liked. They expressed their support most clearly  
71 in the post-coup statements discussing military and financial issues.

72 The supporters of the counter-revolution, which was organized after the sixth month of the  
73 Muhammad Morsi period, soon became an active force. At this point, the internal actors who have  
74 lost their power in the revolutionary period have come into communication and have started the  
75 process of counter-revolution with the support by the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United  
76 Arab Emirates in the region. It should be noted that the importance of the alliances that these  
77 internal actors have established along with the external actors in carrying out the counter-  
78 revolution. Despite the support of the armed forces, the media and the business world, counter-  
79 revolutionary internal actors needed the support of global actors, especially in their economic sense.  
80 As a matter of fact, this external support has great importance in ensuring the legitimacy of future  
81 administration of power in the process of counter-revolution. Inside the counter-revolutionary  
82 front, regional actors, as well as the support of actors at the global level, successfully managed the  
83 process. In this respect, although the internal actors were direct actors in the process of counter-  
84 revolution in Egypt, they got the support of global actors who have succeeded in realizing them.  
85 This external support also initiated the process of internationalization of the Egyptian revolution  
86 with the counter-revolutionary process. In this process not only the actors in Egypt but also  
87 regional and global countries, international organizations, supranational organizations and  
88 transnational organizations were involved in the revolutionary process in a sense as counter-  
89 revolutionary support in Egypt. Direct involvement of global actors was often painful in the  
90 previous revolutionary process which has been very explicit in the case of Egypt. Egypt is another  
91 example of the counter-revolution in that some countries favoring the protection of the status quo  
92 supported by the institutions and figures of some countries, create the scene of the revolutionary  
93 movement.

94 In the case of Egypt, the regional countries that most strongly supported the counter-  
95 revolution movement were Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. These countries  
96 supported Sisi regime both financially and politically, and they demanded that the counter-  
97 revolutionary process is carried out successfully. The alliance of the Gulf States with the Egyptian  
98 army, which also includes the former regime actors, should be seen as a result of co-operation with  
99 the past. As a matter of fact, the coup d'état architect Abdulfettah El-Sisi developed important  
100 relations with Saudi Arabia. Likewise, Hazem El-Biblavi, who was the first prime minister after the  
101 coup, stayed in Kuwait for 18 years as well as in the Arab Money Fund in the United Arab  
102 Emirates for 11 years. Farouk (2014) stated that "as a matter of fact, the first congratulations to Sisi  
103 after the military coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July were Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, and these three  
104 countries became direct supporters of the coup d'état and thus the counter-revolutionary period"  
105 (pp. 9-10). In this part, which is to uncover the role that the global actors had in the course of the  
106 counter-revolution, the roles of both global and regional actors in Egyptian politics will be  
107 analyzed. Since the involvement of the external actors in the revolutionary process, the



108 revolutionary literature shows them as less experienced than the role played by the internal actors;  
109 this part is important in that it constitutes a new example in this field.

110 The Middle East and the Gulf countries are designed by an absolute global power. The  
111 leading countries here have been the United States and the Western Countries that have formed the  
112 system of the region with **2** the framework of a capitalist system. After 1970, when the oil began to  
113 be used as a weapon, the **countries of the region** felt the influence of the **designing countries** more  
114 and more. In the Gulf States, we see that the state establishment is shaped by a family/dynasty as  
115 that they exist in the management of the families throughout their history. These families have used  
116 the people who live under the authoritarian regime in order to guarantee their existence, the  
117 achievements of the trade that precedes the geostrategic position. After the discovery of petroleum,  
118 they have gone to the benefit of distributing a portion of their gains from the oil rent to make the  
119 small profit partner and thus managing them. When this profit was not possible or sufficient to  
120 their citizens, the authorized family made an agreement with the powerful states that were active at  
121 that time in order to protect their sovereignty. This was because military forces were insufficient or  
122 they could not trust the existing military forces or the police forces. To get the blessings that the  
123 Gulf and Middle East region wanted, the powerful states allowed existing families to enrich their oil  
124 wealth with oil after the commerce and before they were able to govern the small states where the  
125 Western Democratic meaning was not allowed to be created. Stability and democracy in these  
126 regions are particularly necessary as long as it permits uninterrupted flow of oil or natural gas.  
127 Indeed, while analyzing the countries affected by the mass uprisings, the dictators or the families of  
128 the theocratic rulers influenced by the Arab Spring were in relatively good relations with the West  
129 till that time. Of course, on the basis of this relationship lied bilateral earnings. Therefore, while  
130 evaluating the Arab Spring movements, it is important to take about the following points by  
131 granting the complaints of the regimes. It may be a reductionist approach to see these movements  
132 as just a struggle for freedom of the oppressed or the people's communities.

133 In these social movements, which are described as Arab Spring and military coup in Egypt,  
134 some analysts think that **14** United States is behind the events and that it is the restructuring of  
135 geography as part of the **Greater Middle East Project**. In this context, a **point of view** that global  
136 forces are the ones that mobilize the internal dynamics in Arab geography gains strength. Mahalli  
137 (2011) stated that even the American newspapers say 'the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is  
138 helping the Syrian opposition', but some still talk about the struggle for democracy in this country  
139 and they do not see the big game being played there. They either do not want to see it or they are  
140 not allowed to see it. Therefore, there was the existence of a hegemonic point of view that made  
141 things in a plan and program. Western countries leading the United States and their democratic or  
142 non-democratic supporters are trying to put in place or deliberately say that everything is  
143 complicated in the name of democracy. According to the West, however, the Islamist parties, which  
144 came to power with the Arab Spring, have no experience of democracy and will not be able to  
145 make political, economic and social choices without different contradictions. In addition, the social  
146 and cultural character of these countries and their political and economic characteristics are not  
147 similar to Israel, the USA or European countries. If this is not the case, there can be a suitable  
148 democracy for them. The Arab Spring could be another name for the completely justified claims of  
149 the Arab people who have been forced to live under the oppression of the dictators for decades  
150 with their dignified struggles. However, in countries that live "in the spring" there has been no  
151 change in the living conditions of the people and this will never happen because the concept of  
152 democracy is a way of life that has political, economic, social, cultural and psychological  
153 dimensions. Using free will voting is only one dimension, but it is not a very important dimension.  
154 The basic concept that should not be ignored in Arab democracies is honor. The honor will not be  
155 provided by tanks, planes, and dollars from the US or NATO. Qatar and Saudi riyals will never get  
156 the honor of Egyptian people. If the illiterate, poor, unemployed and hungry Egyptian are  
157 frightened before going to the ballot, and they have been convinced that all their problems would  
158 be solved, then there was a problem in this democracy.

159 The United States, which has been described as the hegemonic power of the world, has been  
 160 following important events that have emerged around the world, and they are striving to be  
 161 involved in the process. Once the process is complete, they are always on the move in the direction  
 162 of their own interests. When we consider the Egyptian example, the US wants to secure its own  
 163 interests first and then Israel's security and future. The US wanted to shape the post-Mubarak era in  
 164 Egypt within its own interests. In the first place, the Muslim Brotherhood's coming to power and  
 165 representing the majority was not directly beneficial for their self-esteem. As a matter of fact, to  
 166 intervene in this political affair, the US first provoked the other part of the people by using internal  
 167 dynamics. The army has also achieved its goal by incorporating it into its business. On the way to  
 168 the target, the United States was in contact with key actors in the country. Ultimately, the minority  
 169 is superior to the majority.

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## 170 2. *The Role of the United States of America*

171

172 The United States of America, which was caught unprepared for the revolutionary process  
 173 in Egypt and could not develop a coherent policy for this country for two years, also showed an  
 174 inconsistent attitude during the July 2013 coup. The USA, after the declaration of the will of the  
 175 Egyptian army to make a military coup, invited MB to reconcile with the opposition by meeting  
 176 with Hayrat Shatur, one of the well-known leaders of the MB, yet with the realization of the coup  
 177 d'état, the US directly took the side of the new administration which disappointed the supporters of  
 178 democracy in Egypt. The US administration, which did not give a sincere support to the  
 179 democratization of Egypt in the post-Mubarak period, failed to react to the demobilization of  
 180 Morsi, who came to power with democratic elections, in his military coup. In this period, some  
 181 Egyptian civil societies and figures supported by the USA participated in the anti-Morsi field and  
 182 contributed to the removal of the first president who came to the country with democratic  
 183 elections in the country with the military coup. To understand America's reactions, we first need to  
 184 look at its interests. Yazıcı (2014) emphasized that "for ages, the West has never worried about the  
 185 democratization of the Arab world, and nothing matters for the West except the regional stability  
 186 and their economic interests" (p.104). The EU and USA formed several military bases in Egypt and  
 187 made military aid agreements. While America's belief in the developmental dominance of the world  
 188 continues, a result of the internal dynamics of the Egyptian uprisings is considered the first sparks  
 189 of the Arab Spring. Oğuzlu (2011) informed that prior to the Arab Spring, America's interests in  
 190 the region were establishing close ties with Israel, facilitating the flow of oil to the West and making  
 191 it difficult for other global powers to access the region. Before the Arab Spring, everyone in the  
 192 region was aware that some states were seen as one of the most important threats by the USA. The  
 193 existence of some nuclear weapons claimed by the US made it possible for all American  
 194 governments to be regarded as the most important regional threat. With the demands of radical  
 195 religious governance, the countries questioned Israel's existence and legitimacy in the most brutal  
 196 manner. Prashad (2012) informed that the events at Tahrir Square echoed in Washington. The  
 197 prospect of a growing wave of protests spreading throughout the region has made America uneasy.  
 198 Because of the uncontrolled events, American politicians were questioning the following: was the  
 199 US power in the region shaking? How would Israel respond to the fall of the Mubarak regime?  
 200 With confidence and enthusiasm brought about by the fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali, what would  
 201 bring to the Emirates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf of Basra? For this reason, internal  
 202 turmoil in the revolutionary countries like Tunisia and Egypt could serve America's interests.  
 203 Therefore, the attitude of America had been to strive for ways of falling how to favor with them.  
 204 Bingöl (2007) asserted that "in terms of the interests of America, rather than bringing the  
 205 democratic and libertarian governments to work, it will be the most rational choice to contribute to  
 206 its regional policies and to keep the most faithful and closest political staff on the job. In this  
 207 context, it is often a favorable choice for the interests of the United States to support a certain



208 degree of authoritarian rule, free from the public and therefore democratic norms” (p.16). The  
 209 Middle East accounts for 41.5 percent of world natural gas reserves, 55.5% of its reserves. A more  
 210 striking example is that Qatar's natural gas reserves alone can heat up all the houses in the US for a  
 211 hundred years. There are also advantages when the Middle East and the Gulf are controlled by  
 212 international powers. Yazıcı (2014) cited from a Noam Chomsky’s report that “the US never  
 213 permits the processes of democratization to develop fully in the Arab world, and they will allow  
 214 only managed democracies in the region. The US supported the regimes in the Arab world for the  
 215 economic interests, and then withdrew the support for the sake of democracy” (p.105). The US  
 216 wanted to control the MENA region as a tool of the world superpower. The US, which sees  
 217 Europe as an important competitor, is more or less comparable to the US in terms of economy and  
 218 population. The way to keep Europe under control is to make it dependent on oil by controlling  
 219 the oil on its own.

220 Egypt always had an important **5** position in the Arab world. So as to explain the policy of  
 221 the US towards Egypt, it is necessary to examine Egypt's relations with Israel, the West and the  
 222 Islamic world. Following the popular uprising that took place in January 2011, after ousting Hosni  
 223 Mubarak, the ruling soldiers took a decision to open the Gaza border with Palestine in the spring of  
 224 2011. This was done in order to secure their own legitimacy and to control the potential social  
 225 opposition and anger. Then the Muslim Brotherhood, who took over the power, kept the human  
 226 corridor open to Gaza and keep the Hamas and Fatah support consensus negotiations. The Muslim  
 227 Brotherhood candidate in a general sense, the Morsi administration, favored a relationship based on  
 228 rational and common interests that would be unexpected in its relations with the West. Morsi's visit  
 229 to the United States for the UN General Assembly, his negotiations with EU officials in Brussels,  
 230 and his visit to Italy and Germany were the infrastructure preparations for rational and joint  
 231 constructive relations. The Israeli attack on Palestine in 2012 is important for the Morsi  
 232 administration to reveal its side. Morsi played an active role in the movement that led to a visit to  
 233 Gaza. The new power with Islamic identity was already a usual doubt for the US and Israel.  
 234 Therefore, one of the first actions of the military regime, who replaced the Muslim Brotherhood by  
 235 a military coup d'état in 2013, was to close the Gaza border gate.

236 The attitude of Morsi from an Islamic tradition, the attitude of him after Israel attack on  
 237 Palestine, and the attitude of the 10 million Christian minority constituting the Egyptian population  
 238 were in favor of the military regime against the Morsi administration which were decisive in US  
 239 policies regarding the military coup against Morsi. According to US thinking, millions of Egyptian  
 240 people worried about the country and wanted the army to intervene on behalf of the government  
 241 in order to stop the chaos and violence. The United States is undertaking tremendous tasks related  
 242 to the order of the world. During the Cold War, the United States has used discourses such as civil  
 243 liberties, democracy **18** and the right of nations to self-determinate to the Union of Soviet Socialist  
 244 Republics (USSR) **17** a foreign policy tool. With the collapse of the USSR, the US has abandoned  
 245 such discourses as **democracy, human rights, and the right of the nations to** self-determination in a  
 246 unipolar world while it has focused on 'order' for the continuation of the hegemony. It is possible  
 247 to say that in this framework, the policy of the USA against the military coup is in the direction of  
 248 its benefits. America has prevented the Islamic-dominated government from long-term use by  
 249 taking advantage of Egypt's internal balances for its own interests in the US. Egypt is an important  
 250 strategic **1** point between Africa and Europe and it is more than useful and practical for the policies  
 251 of US **in the Middle East.**

252 Ever since **the** first traces of the Arab Spring began to emerge, arguments have been  
 253 raised that the severe social movements in the region were prepared and directed by the United  
 254 States. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, many analysts who were interested in and working  
 255 on the process had found that the United States has restructured this geography under the Greater  
 256 Middle East Project (GMEP). The initiatives of the USA in the past in this geography mean that  
 257 the force of the dominant powers in the world in every period of history, in searching of the new  
 258 sources, particularly in the geography of the Middle East, means that the potential domino effect in

259 this region was very low by happening spontaneously. There must be a strong power to make the  
260 people mobile in order to change the old autocratic regime. Especially, the biggest demand of the  
261 global economy, energy like oil and natural gas was the most common in the region; therefore, it  
262 reduced the likelihood that large states would give the Middle Eastern People up to the future of  
263 the region on themselves. Besides the energy resources, the Middle East has been the center of  
264 world trade for centuries. Due to its geopolitical position, this region connects the East and West  
265 along with the North and South. However, in the case of both peace and war, this geography is a  
266 great market for capitalist forces. In the time of peace, the population living in the region  
267 constitutes a large market for the global companies. In addition, the Middle East is the largest  
268 market for weapons trade, as it is the place where wars have been prominent in the history. If  
269 ideological, ethnic, political and religious reasons also add to these factors, it would be more  
270 optimistic to imagine that the imperialist powers would leave the region to their fate. Therefore, the  
271 recent history of the Middle East clearly demonstrates that there are constant conflicts of interest  
272 over this region. The intervention of the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan along with the intervention  
273 of the NATO army in Libya and Syria were the proofs of this idea. Undoubtedly, the Western  
274 world and especially the United States, the most powerful military-political-industrial complex of  
275 the global world, closely followed the improvements in the Middle East. They wanted to intervene  
276 in the progressive stages, even if not at the beginning of events. In Egypt, for example, in this  
277 sense, the United States had attempted to shape the post-Hosni Mubarak rule in the direction of its  
278 own interests and had attempted to establish close ties with key actors for this purpose. America  
279 had been quite successful. The Gaddafi administration, which had been in ruling for many years in  
280 Libya, had been a threat to the whole world and humanity in the Arab Spring process and military  
281 operations had been organized there with the demand of the United States. America chased similar  
282 policies on Syria. Without a doubt, the United States was involved in the process in its center. All  
283 these reasons leave the impression that the events of Tunisia in the Middle East are spread by  
284 domino effect and that millions of people were influenced by the leading of great powers.

285 The statement of President Obama's post-coup demonstration shows that Washington  
286 had an ambiguous policy on Egypt, and yet the USA can be easily adapted to turn against Morsi.  
287 Obama has not described the Chief of General Staff Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's Egyptian seizure as a  
288 military coup. In addition, he also expressed that Egypt wants rapid democratic governance. Having  
289 said that the US would not be able to support the one-party or one-man government, Obama said  
290 that Washington would reassess Cairo's aid in the wake of the US's failure to help the countries  
291 governed by the military coup and that Egypt must now meet democratic institutions. In the  
292 following days of the coup, contacts and high-level statements emerged that the United States was  
293 not disturbed by the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood [16](#) approved the administration of the  
294 country by the military regime under Al Sisi leadership. [US Deputy Secretary of State William](#)  
295 [Burns, who](#) made his first official visit to Egypt after the coup, did not give any reference to the  
296 military coup in his statement after he visited the General Abdulfettah Al-Sisi and other transition  
297 process leaders. He stated that "the truth is that only Egyptians themselves can make the hard  
298 choices required to build an inclusive, tolerant, democratic future," Burns said. "I also know that  
299 they will find a determined partner in the United States" ([www.dw.com](http://www.dw.com)). He also emphasized in his  
300 15<sup>th</sup> July 2013 visit that "he did not come with American solutions, nor did he come to lecture  
301 anyone. America would not try to impose their model on Egypt." This visit, which was made just  
302 right after military coup d'état and their statements such as "America were ensured that Egypt  
303 would advance towards democracy with this new administration", also gave the signs that America  
304 would act with the Egyptian army in the transition period together. Therefore, Burns did not  
305 require meeting any members of the [M11](#) who were eager for Morsi's reinstatement. Quite  
306 interestingly, he did also not meet with the [representatives of "Tamarod movement," the anti-Morsi](#)  
307 [movement that led to his fall](#). At that time MB representatives accused the USA of backing or even  
308 instigating the coup. The Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Farid Ismail (2013) stated that "the  
309 Americans carried out the military coup - they didn't just recognize the new leaders, they carried out



310 the coup. We know, and we have specific information about the communications that preceded the  
 311 coup, which proves that the US planned it and General Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi executed it”  
 312 (www.dw.com). Fisk (2013) stated about the issue and America’s stance as;

313 For the first time in the history of the world, a coup is not a coup. The army takes over,  
 314 depose and imprison the democratically elected president, suspend the constitution, arrest  
 315 the usual suspects, close down television stations and mass their armor in the streets of the  
 316 capital. But the word ‘coup’ does not – and cannot – cross the lips of the Blessed Barack  
 317 Obama. Nor does the hopeless UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon dares to utter such an  
 318 offensive word. It’s not as if Obama doesn’t know what’s going on (independent.co.uk).

319 This also shows that America did not 2 anything for democracy in Egypt; on the other  
 320 hand, it supported the coup surreptitiously. In fact, “what democracy aid has done is to represent  
 321 the superiority of the US model of liberal democracy in maintaining the national interests of the US  
 322 at the expense of subject colonial people” (Snider and Faris 2011). The USA gave a high amount of  
 323 aid, yet this was not spent on the democratic tools or human right organizations. On the other  
 324 hand, these aids went through for the military which was the main supplier of the regime and the  
 325 main set against democracy in Egypt. Hamid (2011) confirmed about this aid and its yield as;

326 Egypt provides unconditional and complete support for US objectives and operations  
 327 (including anti-terrorism), and provides a big market for US products, while providing  
 328 legitimacy for Israeli actions (particularly in Gaza, historically considered to fall under the  
 329 auspices of Egypt in international Arabism), securing access to the Suez Canal and giving  
 330 use of its airspace for US military operations (p.27).

331 Also it promoted the military by their statements and also financial support. Therefore, the  
 332 US administration, which had performed poorly in order to pursue a democratic attitude  
 333 immediately after the military coup d’état, lost the credibility of democracy in Cairo along with the  
 334 Egyptian public confidence. Yazıcı (2014) stated about the attitude of the USA from the news of  
 335 Washington times and BBC news as;

336 John Kerry speculated that Egypt’s military was restoring democracy and was asked to  
 337 intervene by millions of people who were afraid of chaos and violence. He said on GEO  
 338 TV: “The military was asked to intervene by millions and millions of people, all of whom  
 339 were afraid of a descendant into chaos, into violence. And the military did not take over, to  
 340 the best of our judgment so — so far.”<sup>388</sup> As obvious, the US government rejected to  
 341 describe removal of Morsi as a coup not to cut off its annual aid to Egypt. Kerry reminded  
 342 that the military did not take over so far and to run the country, there is a civilian  
 343 government (p. 129).

344 Nevertheless, the general policy of the US to post-revolutionary Egypt, whoever comes to  
 345 power, was the policy of protecting America’s interests by developing relations with the  
 346 administration which has continued more openly during the Sisi’s period. The Obama  
 347 administration has given military and political support to the Sisi and junta regime to guarantee the  
 348 US interests in the region. The US has been supporting the Egyptian army and the former regime  
 349 in the aftermath of the coup d’état. Despite the intense pressure c4 paign against the Muslim  
 350 Brotherhood movement that damning the violence and the abuses of human rights in the country,  
 351 the unresponsive attitude of the USA to the Sisi administration, is a proof that Washington does  
 352 not care about a real sense of democracy in the country. The US aid policy to Egypt has also been  
 353 achieved by ignoring democratic principles in the interests of Washington. The United States has  
 354 not announced military intervention as a coup d’état so that 1.5 billion dollars of aid given to Egypt  
 355 every year cannot be cut off. Yet, after international reactions and increased human rights abuses in  
 356 Egypt, the USA has frozen \$ 260 million in aid to Egypt at that time. In contrast, the US State  
 357 Department spokesman Jan Psaki indicated that military aid to serve the interests of the USA and  
 358 Israel would continue and these military aid benefits were vital to the Egyptian terrorist fight and  
 359 border security issues. As a matter of the fact that US government expressed that apache  
 360 helicopters which were being delayed to deliver till 2014 would be sent to Cairo as soon as possible.

361 In this way, while the United States continued military aid to Egypt from one side, the US aimed to  
 362 ensure that the Sisi administration acted in line with US interests.

363 The oppression politics and human rights violations carried out by the Sisi administration  
 364 against both the Muslim Brotherhood movement and other revolutionary movements during the  
 365 counter-revolutionary period in Egypt have not been met with a serious reaction by Washington  
 366 for a long time. Even so, even if hundreds of MB members were condemned to death in Egypt, the  
 367 US could not prevent Egypt from transmitting arms aid. Murphy (2014) emphasized that America  
 368 has been underestimated by the death penalty given as a result of purely political trials. Despite the  
 369 human rights violations in the country, the decision to maintain military aid to Cairo is an indication  
 370 that the US preferred democracy to the status quo in Egypt. America continued this policy until Sisi  
 371 was elected President of the Republic. In the following years, America has supported Sisi more and  
 372 has contributed to strengthening his international legitimacy. Because of the human rights abuses in  
 373 Egypt and ongoing pressure, a group of intellectuals was asking Obama to cut off military support  
 374 for Egypt. The Obama administration, which did not listen to the calls, continued to support the  
 375 coup in Egypt. Abdulfettah El-Sisi, who came to the United States for the United Nations General  
 376 Assembly, also met with Barack Obama as part of his contacts. Obama met with Sisi despite the  
 377 call of the human rights institutions to the opposite side. Obama emphasized that Egypt and the  
 378 US have common concerns, and that the strategic cooperation between the two countries was  
 379 inevitable. This approach of the Obama administration has not only brought legitimacy to the Sisi  
 380 regime but has also paved the way for the pressure on opponents of the coup to continue  
 381 increasingly in Egypt. The United States continued its economic, political and military aid to Egypt  
 382 after the coup too. US Secretary of State John Kerry underlined that America attaches great  
 383 importance to Egypt's security and **22**ed that America was ready to make political and economic **19**  
 384 aid to Cairo for democratization. **Secretary of State John Kerry (2015) stated officially in U.S.-**  
 385 **Egypt Strategic Dialogue forum in Cairo that**

386 ...and finally, the last thing, let me just reiterate the United States and Egypt are both at our  
 387 best when we are working to improve institutions of governance, to support political  
 388 reform, because good governance is the single most important platform for any country's  
 389 success in the 21st century. It's more vital than oil or precious minerals or a deep-water  
 390 port. And, believe me, we are confronting our own challenges in the United States. We are  
 391 not suggesting we have all the answers. But we are engaged in a pretty open process of  
 392 working at our own process to develop ongoing reform. Egypt has a very long, very proud  
 393 history of independence and leadership. Egypt has really always been the hub of the Arab  
 394 world and of this region. And we have no doubt that, with the right economic choices and  
 395 the right choices about governance, Egypt is going to continue to play this vital role. That's  
 396 why the United States is so deeply committed to this relationship. We are confident that  
 397 Egypt has really good reason to ensure that the fundamental rights of its citizens are  
 398 protected, that vital principles such as due process and freedom of press and association are  
 399 cherished, and that women are empowered, and that every Egyptian has the right to  
 400 participate peacefully within a truly democratic political process. No great country – and  
 401 Egypt is without question a great country – should settle for any less... (eg.usembassy.gov).

402 The USA policy has shown that since the Egyptian military coup, the Washington  
 403 administration wants an ally to emerge in Egypt that will serve its long-term interests rather than  
 404 democratize it. Obama administration was aware of the necessity of a strong regime in Egypt for  
 405 establishing a regime preceded by the regional interests of Israel and the USA which had not seen  
 406 any disadvantage in supporting the Al Sisi regime and the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt.

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### 3. The Role of the European Union

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The European Union is a regional integration process that is constantly evolving with the tendency towards everyday expansion and deepening from the past. The EU has tried to carry out the enlargement with some political, economic and institutional treaties, but decided to carry out a neighboring policy with the neighboring countries at the end of the enlargement process so as to maintain the principle of manageability within the boundaries of the existing borders. The EU has preferred to behave differently to the countries where it attaches more importance to the geographical area, especially in the Middle East. The EU has come to regard the oppressive attitudes of authoritarian regimes in the countries in the light of their political interests. Brussels A 70/13 Press (2013) highlighted the fluency of the democratic situation and underlined “while overall significant progress has been made in promoting democratic reforms (e.g. holding of elections in line with democratic standards, strengthening of the role of civil society, increased freedom of expression and assembly) many obstacles still need to be overcome in order for these transitions to be successfully consolidated” (p.1). Egypt, for example, where the regime was highly oppressive, had also become the most beneficiary of EU funds. There were countries such as Jordan and Morocco, which were geographically important for the EU, although EU had done little to reform. In short, the EU is in the Middle East politics; democracy, good governance, human rights, the rule of law, etc. aimed at disseminating and developing the concepts, but the result showed the limit of the EU in the subject area.

The regional cooperation that the EU wanted to realize towards the Middle East has faced some difficulties. At the head of these difficulties were authoritarian regimes in the region. The concept of democratization that the EU wanted to promote was inherently dangerous for authoritarian regimes. The mentioned regimes had sometimes resisted changes in the point where they were beginning to clash with their interests, even if they had supported regional cooperation. The conflicts in the Middle East, a challenging geography, had caused the EU trouble in its politics in the region. In addition to the Arab Spring process, internal disturbances and conflicts, stability in the region had suffered serious damage and cooperation had remained quite backward. Of course, as well as adding to the fact that the EU always puts itself at the center as well as positions other collaborators according to EU benefits, bilateral relations had been adversely affected. In addition to all these, the EU was fighting the dilemma of democratization and stabilization in the region. This dilemma was related to the different foreign policy initiatives of member countries, their different interests and their security preferences.

The EU in principle has adopted cooperation and stability as a common foreign policy objective, thus choosing a democracy-based security model. The regional security, free trade and the development of civil society, the EU had assumed that EU could achieve its goal for the Middle East. The failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership policy, the Arab Spring, which started at the end of 2010, as well as the repressive regimes in the Middle East, have prevented it. The EU, which has pursued various policies for the democratization of the Middle East, wanted to guarantee its security on this issue, but in any case, did not support the idea of bringing new ones instead of existing regimes like the US. Since the beginning of its interest in geography, the EU has preferred not to communicate with religion-based movements, preferring to maintain distance with local dynamics. Yet, after 2010, the political power of the political Islamic movements in the MENA increased and their voices started to rise. In the Arab Spring period, the EU's lack of communication was felt deeply and the EU wanted to make up its mistake by recognizing the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt. This situation has clearly shown that the EU is actively promoting its own security, not spreading the democratization movement in the region. The lack of democracy in that region and Arab countries has created a great security threat for the countries in the West. The political pressure created by the authoritarianism of the regime in Egypt had caused the radicalization of various groups away from the peaceful paths in order to be able to have a say

459 in politics. Therefore, these events threatened the security of the West as a result of regional  
460 instability. Emphasizing the need for the development of civil liberties and democracy in the region,  
461 the EU has stated that political reforms should be enhanced. However, differences have arisen  
462 between what was said and what was done while the changes that the EU has made with the  
463 Neighborhood Policy have not been realized. Brussels A 70/13 Press (2013) took the attention on  
464 that “EU support to stimulate sustainable economic growth is therefore crucial to the promotion of  
465 democratic institutions, provided that the countries of the region contribute to the promotion of a  
466 friendly environment for investments, jobs and growth. It should be underlined that economics has  
467 a deep connection with politics. An economic collapse would imply a political failure of the  
468 transition” (p.2). Economic assistance to support the political reforms in the region has not reached  
469 adequate levels and most of the assistance has been transferred to issues such as terrorism,  
470 immigration and border control rather than projects to support democracy. That’s to say, the EU  
471 did not regard the concept of democracy as a self-imposed value but instrumentalized it as a  
472 concept that could prevent terrorism, especially targeting the Western countries. The authoritarian  
473 regimes have been the most beneficial to this situation, and with the support of the West, they have  
474 created a fear that radical Islamic groups would be able to seize power over the people. However,  
475 the authoritarian regime’s policy carried out by the Western countries had not brought security to  
476 the countries of the region. On the other hand, the inadequate political reforms that have been  
477 carried out by the authoritarian regimes had worsened the situation in the region. The EU’s  
478 endorsement of the authoritarian regimes in the political arena to block radical Islamic groups had  
479 brought more confusion than stability. For instance, the political rights in Egypt had been reduced  
480 and the field of action of civil society organizations had been narrowed. The authoritarian regime  
481 became even stronger in countries where repressive regimes were effective.

482 The EU used some tools to better manage the process in Egypt. These tools to support  
483 the construction process included: persuasive international diplomacy, humanitarian aid, various  
484 sanctions, [embargo](#), many visits made by the EU representatives to the region (Commission  
485 Members, High Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European  
486 Commission and members of the European Parliament). When the developments began, perhaps  
487 it was unlikely that the events would spread so quickly, that most authoritarian regimes in the  
488 region would end, and that the region might have varied in many ways. Arab Spring was initially  
489 called with relatively more positive approach at the beginning. Yet, when the time passed, Arab  
490 awakening, Arab uprising, Arab revolution, and Arab transformation was called in a different way.  
491 However, it is referred and called, one thing is certain that the process is still uncertain and  
492 unpredictable as to where it will go. The European Union has given importance to developing its  
493 relations particularly in the economic, political and in terms of security with the states, which have  
494 the Mediterranean coast. In this context, the EU [has](#) placed great emphasis on developing relations  
495 with Egypt, one of the most important states [of the Mediterranean and the Middle East](#). The  
496 relationship between Egypt and the European states has a long history. The economic and political  
497 relationships between the EU and Egypt began to develop, especially in the period of Hosni  
498 Mubarak. One of the main reasons for this is that Mubarak was following a foreign policy  
499 consistent with the interests of Western states and the EU attached importance to cooperation with  
500 Egypt in economic, political and security matters. Mubarak’s emphasis on cooperation with  
501 Western states had allowed him to be supported during his thirty-year governing power without  
502 questioning his government, even though it had not come with democratic elections. The  
503 European Union is shaping the democratization of the Middle East region. Archick, Belkin,  
504 Blanchard, Ek and Mix (2011) emphasized that first of all, a significant number of African Muslims  
505 live within the borders of the European Union. It is estimated that this number is 15 to 20 million.  
506 Thus there is a “Muslim ghetto” that can affect political life in European countries and each year  
507 there is official and informal migration from the Middle East to Europe. In this case, the number of  
508 the Muslim population is increasing rapidly. Secondly, the European Union imports nearly half of  
509 its energy sources from the Middle East. The instability in the region or, in other words, the threat



510 of the security of the energy supply is threatening the 'life vein' for Europe. Third, the EU is a  
 511 major commercial partner of the Middle East countries. The process of conversion, called the Arab  
 512 Spring, has served as a litmus paper for the differences between the union countries. After this  
 513 event, the domino effect of the countries of the region is the change of the administrations one  
 514 after another. It is clear that the basic policies of the locomotive countries of the EU differ, and  
 515 that the common security and foreign policy, that had become more institutionalized after the  
 516 Lisbon process, had not worked. Britain, France and Germany have pursued a differentiated  
 517 foreign policy due to their historical, geographical and varied interests on the MENA region  
 518 countries, revealing that the unity is not real. How the EU reacts to the changes in the Arab world  
 519 is presented in the framework of the neighborhood policy, which is dated the 8<sup>th</sup> March 2011.  
 520 "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean." This report  
 521 (2011) stated that "the EU wants to support them in building real democracies and peaceful and  
 522 prosperous societies. Each country and people will of course choose their own path and make their  
 523 own choices. It is rightly for them to decide and not for us to seek to impose solutions" (p.14). So  
 524 as to define the regional policy of the Union, it is stated that the people living in common  
 525 communities have a historical process which will give result not only for the regional states but also  
 526 for the whole world as well as the EU. In terms of the people of the region, civil liberties, pluralism,  
 527 the rule of law and the prospect of social justice flourish, whereas the transition periods of  
 528 democracy have never been easy, and the transition process has always been faced with risks and  
 529 uncertainties. For this reason, it is emphasized that the EU should not be passive, but should be  
 530 supportive within the framework of the three elements determined by the transition states.  
 531 European Commission (2011) declared these as;

532 Democratic transformation and institutional structuring, liberties, constitutional reforms,  
 533 judicial reform and fight against corruption,  
 534 Strong partnerships with the people, support for civil society, increased communication  
 535 from the people,  
 536 Sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development, especially small and medium-  
 537 sized enterprises (SMEs), health improvement, education systems and the development of  
 538 poor regions (ec. europa.eu).  
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540 The relations between Egypt and the EU are realized within the framework of the  
 541 European Commission declared document mentioned above. However, we can see that the values  
 542 written in these documents do not take place in practical relations, and values do not reflect in the  
 543 actions. In short, there are serious differences between words and actions. The last example of this  
 544 can be seen just after the coup d'état in Egypt. As a matter of fact, the European Union, which  
 545 supports the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy and democratic reforms in Egypt,  
 546 had shown its failure to the illegitimate overthrow of the first elected first president of Egypt. This  
 547 event led to the questioning of the normative power of the EU. It is also seen in the last case that  
 548 the European Union that when it is in between values and benefits, European Union has always  
 549 been in the benefit side; therefore, the values remain in the back seat. Ceyhun (2013) summarized  
 550 the process of European Union towards Egypt; it was the fact that the emergence in Egypt showed  
 551 that the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU did not apply to Muslims. Muslims have democratically  
 552 applied their right of self-determination; this revealed the real faces of some in EU countries  
 553 because they were at odds with the Copenhagen Criteria in this sample. In particular, it would have  
 554 been the most sacred of the EU principles to respect the right of the Muslims who claim their own  
 555 destinies by saying 'more democracy'. The EU, which supported the downfall of the democratically  
 556 elected president with the military coup in Egypt, understood democracy, however they just chose  
 557 to serve their own benefits. The Arab Spring has created some serious advantages and  
 558 opportunities in order for the EU to be able to put forward a common foreign policy while  
 559 bringing with it a lot of complications. The Arab Spring process seems to be an opportunity to  
 560 create a new foreign policy on behalf of the member states or to revise the existing one to create a

561 process of repairing its weak sides, but as a result it has not caused a comprehensive political  
562 change that could bring the EU's relations with the Middle East geography to a new level. It has  
563 not allowed the EU to change its common foreign policy image, which was exhibited before the  
564 Arab Spring, to be renewed. The Arab Spring has led to an increase in mutual competition and  
565 conflict of ideas between the member states of the EU with the ongoing process of conflict, and  
566 the impact of the EU on the process has been further diminished by the fact that the members  
567 have their national foreign policies in front of the EU. With the Arab Spring, it is now clear that  
568 nothing will be as old as MENA. From now on, the countries in the region will determine their  
569 own future, while international actors will have to adapt to the situation in question. Unfortunately,  
570 the power struggle that followed the Arab Spring is a battle for global and regional actors to widen  
571 their influence in order to dominate the region, leading them to a position than before the  
572 revolutions of the region began. In terms of the EU, the situation seems even worse. Whether or  
573 not the EU, which is trying to make every opportunity feel like it wants to be a global actor in  
574 important regions like MENA, has a real sense of this, the Arab Spring had emerged. The Union,  
575 which has been struggling to become a global power, has not succeeded in implementing a  
576 common policy in Egypt for the democracy. In this policy difference, conflicts of interest between  
577 members and conflicts of ideas are taking great importance. Dersan (2006) stated that “the United  
578 States and Europe share key interests with regard to the Middle East. The first and most important  
579 common concern related to the Middle East is strategic interests. Both parties express their desire  
580 for a stable Middle East since instability and domestic conflicts in the Middle East interrupt  
581 commerce, create refugees and generate domestic pressures” (p.100). In other words, the European  
582 Union's policy toward the Middle East has been shaped around security, political and economic  
583 interests in general terms. Security interests are possible risks from regional conflicts, terrorism, the  
584 spread of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal immigration from geographical proximity to  
585 Europe. Political interests, on the other hand, are generally peace and stability in conflicts in Arab-  
586 Israeli and other regions. Finally, economic interests, a more important issue, include secure access  
587 to energy resources along with increased exports of the EU to regional markets. The EU has  
588 supported the developments that have taken place in countries in the region since the beginning of  
589 the Arab Spring for them to become democratic. The Foreign Ministers of the term stressed civil  
590 liberties in the uprising process and explained that they expect the changing governments to respect  
591 every aspect of the different social groups in these countries. At the G8 Summit in France 21  
592 tips for the EU's new policy on the Middle East and North Africa were announced by German  
593 Chancellor Angela Merkel. It has been recommended that new democracies established in  
594 consideration of the developments that are realized in the Arab world should be restored to a stable  
595 structure so as to resolve the present economic instabilities as soon as possible. It was also  
596 emphasized that new governments and reforms should not be in danger. Merkel said that helping  
597 the Arab Spring process alone would not provide a solution, and that in the past it had fallen into  
598 this fault, and that other basic points were also overlooked because of this mistake. She also stated  
599 that Arab countries should take steps to take responsibility for economic and social improvement  
600 in the Arab world without ignoring human rights. Merkel emphasized that the EU should play a  
601 leading role among other western states in helping to promote economic cooperation and  
602 employment policy among Arab countries. Merkel clarified the outline of the foreign policy  
603 perspective of the EU towards the MENA region. It was seen that in the process called the Arab  
604 Spring, the commercial relations of the European Union with the countries in this region gained  
605 concrete momentum.

606 Less democratic countries have tried to move to a more democratic system with various  
607 rebellions and protests with the Arab Spring. However, it has been a difficult process and  
608 experience for the MENA countries, which have been governed by colonial and authoritarian  
609 regimes until now. The historical heritage of the country, which has an administrative democracy  
610 that revolves around an anti-democratic manner like Egypt, has also affected the mentioned  
611 democratization process in a negative way. Revolutions in the Arab Spring have initiated a major



612 process of change in the MENA region. Considering the human and natural resources in the  
 613 region, historical reflexes and the political demands of the people, it is clear that the Arab Spring  
 614 case is going to cause serious changes and transformations over time. For this reason, it may be  
 615 wrong for us to make comments about the future of the region with the events that take place only  
 616 by considering today's hot issues. Moreover, it is not right to evaluate that the developments  
 617 experienced in the MENA region in the process of transition to democracy as successful or  
 618 unsuccessful. As a result, people living in the MENA have suffered various experiences which has  
 619 worn people out over time because of the unrest and demanded democracy. On the other hand,  
 620 we can understand that no transformation on earth is easy, as the French revolution has begun to  
 621 show its consequences after almost 200 years.

622 One of the most challenging exams of the EU foreign policy, at the beginning of 2011,  
 623 the European Union had five main political aims. These aims were; economic cooperation,  
 624 immigration and refugee policy, fight against international terrorism, living in peace with its  
 625 neighbors and human rights, the rule of law, democratization, and modernization. The EU has  
 626 adopted an approach that promotes economic welfare in providing a democratic transformation in  
 627 Egypt. The EU has supported the rule of law and increased employment in the transitional  
 628 cooperation process for Egypt. The EU took a concrete step on the role to play in Egypt's  
 629 democratic transformation in 2011 with various agreements. The EU stressed the Egyptian people's  
 630 desire to achieve a promising economic structure, stating that a democratic and human rights-based  
 631 government should be established and that the demands raised by the people should be taken into  
 632 account. In February 2011, the first reaction from European Union to Mubarak's resignation came  
 633 from Merkel. Merkel explained that the resignation of Mubarak was a service and historical change  
 634 to the people of Egypt as they shared in the happiness with the Egyptian people. In this context,  
 635 for the EU countries considering Israel's security in the region, European Union followed a more  
 636 cautious policy in Egypt because of the emergence of popular movements in Egypt and the  
 637 predominance of Islamic structures. Behr (2012) stated about the policy of EU after Arab Spring  
 638 as;

639 ... when it comes to the democratic transition processes in the region, the EU's new policy  
 640 is unlikely to have a significant impact or to translate into a new role for the EU as a  
 641 promoter of "sustainable stability" in the region. Similarly, the EU has so far failed to stake  
 642 out a viable new position for itself in the emerging geopolitical context of the Middle East.  
 643 What makes matters worse is that the EU's commitment to Arab democracy once again  
 644 appears to be sidelined by its broader geopolitical goals. This makes it more and more  
 645 unlikely that the EU will act as a driver for change in the southern Mediterranean. Instead it  
 646 seems bound to pursue a new variation of its long-standing Euro-Mediterranean vision that  
 647 places partnership over democratic principles (p.87).

648 In the history of the MB for the first time, elections in the Middle East have led to a  
 649 worrisome situation in many issues in the EU. Western states have experienced the fear that they  
 650 would lose their sovereignty over Egypt. This is because the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic  
 651 discourse and the foreign policy they pursued during their one-year rule are different from the  
 652 politics of the Egyptian political leaders to which Western states are so accustomed. As a result, the  
 653 US, Israel and the European Union were not satisfied with the policies of the MB. Unlike the  
 654 Mubarak regime, the policies of the Morsi administration raised concerns that the Egyptian-  
 655 Western alliance, which had existed for a long time, might be damaged as predicted. The EU had  
 656 not provided strong support for reforms and power in Egypt during the transition period of  
 657 democracy. The EU had perceived the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in general terms on the  
 658 perception of the actors in domestic politics, media and soldiers. They did not provide the  
 659 necessary support to Egypt during the transition period of democracy. In this case, the democratic  
 660 transformation in Egypt made the process even more fragile which resulted in a military coup on  
 661 the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013. In July 2013, after Morsi was removed from office by the General Abdulfettah Al-  
 662 Sisi, the European Union made a faint call for the release of President Morsi, who was arrested

663 during the coup in Egypt. The EU Foreign Policy Unit Report (2014) stated about the situation in  
 664 Egypt as “EU member states agree informally to suspend export licenses for some types of  
 665 equipment that could be used for internal repression, but do not impose an arms embargo or other  
 666 negative measures” (p.14). Just after the coup, as the Sisi administration imprisoned 528 anti-coup  
 667 people in Egypt. The Foreign Minister of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2014) explained that  
 668 “it is not a positive trend in the European Union that the majority of the people in Egypt continued  
 669 to be exempted from the political representation” (dw.com). In September 2014, following general  
 670 elections, Sisi made formal negotiations in various EU countries. Therefore, Sisi’s politic  
 671 negotiations showed that European Union does not care about the democracy of the democratic  
 672 election. After the coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, the America and the Gulf states avoided calling the  
 673 Egyptian coup as a military coup d’état. The European Union did not describe the military coup  
 674 d’état in Egypt as a ‘coup’. Therefore, this showed that European Union had a similar attitude to  
 675 the US with the statement he made in the EU. The former High Representative of the EU External  
 676 Relations and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton explained that after taking control of the army in  
 677 Egypt “I challenge all sides of Egypt to retail to the democratic process including free and fair  
 678 presidential and parliamentary elections in the framework of the new constitution”. The newly  
 679 elected president had to govern in a completely inclusive approach so that the country could  
 680 survive and complete the democratic transformation”. A spokesman for the EU Commission said  
 681 that while the process of going to the coup was assessed, “the army in Egypt has moved into action  
 682 with the support of a significant majority of the Egyptian people, because of the rising tension and  
 683 polarization”. These show that EU did not support Islamic governance as the members thought  
 684 that Morsi’s government could not respond to the expectations of the people and did not make  
 685 necessary reforms in the country. Although these statements, contradicting the EU’s democratic  
 686 principles, show that the EU was, in fact, a dilemma between ‘stability’ and ‘human rights’ in the  
 687 region. The Conversation (2013) emphasized the attitude of the EU “the EU has always preferred  
 688 stability over democracy in the Middle East, conscious that any political change towards democratic  
 689 reforms in this region would produce instability in the short to medium term”  
 690 (theconversation.com). It is important that the degree to which new parties in power such as in  
 691 Egypt, where democracy is beginning to take a turn for the better, attract importance to the  
 692 relations with the West, and that it cannot protect the interests of the region after the  
 693 transformation is complete. Concerns such as ‘political Islam’ show that the West prefers the  
 694 ‘stability’ that has taken place for a long time.

695 After the army's coup in Egypt ousted Morsi, the first elected president of the country, the  
 696 opponents gathered in Rabi'at'ul Adeviyye Square to protest the coup and declared that they would  
 697 not withdraw from the squares until Morsi returned. The international community, especially the  
 698 EU and the US, have remained silent about the massacres committed by the army against the  
 699 Muslim Brotherhood and the demonstrators. The international community and the EU have not  
 700 provided the necessary support for the democratic transformation of Egypt. Having had significant  
 701 roles in the democratic transformation of Eastern Europe, the EU did not have an effective role in  
 702 the democratic transformation of Egypt. Barnes (2013) stated that “the impact of our democracy  
 703 and governance activities in Egypt has been limited and unnoticeable in indexes describing the  
 704 country democratic environment” (p.62). The silence of the EU and the international community  
 705 have ‘legitimacy’ to coup management. The crisis in Egypt has also adversely affected the expected  
 706 change in the region with the Arab Spring. The crisis in Egypt, which has led Arab geography for  
 707 many years with the possibility of lasting longer, continues to adversely affect Egypt and the region  
 708 in the short term.

709 The EU, which strived to be constructive throughout the lives of Egypt, organized a meeting  
 710 with the member foreign ministers in August of 2013, in response to the violent suppression by  
 711 policy of the military administration to Morsi supporters. The EU decided that the embargo should  
 712 be applied to all kinds of goods that may be used for violence at the meeting, and they decided to  
 713 rethink financial aid in addition. Some members of the EU had not found enough of the



714 democratic development level in Egypt as time goes on, and they were quite disturbed by social and  
715 sectarian disagreements. The European Parliament, which could not clearly show that it is anti-  
716 coup, had demanded to stop the aid in March 2013. Yet, the EU had not stopped financial support  
717 for Sisi's military administration, as it would undermine the interests of corruption in Egypt. The  
718 EU had stopped the arms trade to Egypt in order to prevent its use only for the people. In order to  
719 influence the coup, the EU has used many instruments either individually or separately, including:  
720 economic and humanitarian aid, various sanctions, and military interventions that they did not like  
721 much during their history. However, the variety of tools the EU used in this process does not show  
722 that it has undergone a change at the core of the policy that it is trying to carry out in the region.  
723 Since the countries of the MENA region differ from each other in every sense and give different  
724 reactions to the same events, the EU has preferred, especially to support of political change in  
725 some regions while maintaining the existing authorities to help stability in some countries. Unless  
726 the EU's approach, which positions the EU upside down and centered on Europe, is changed,  
727 more and more various instruments will be the more it will not lead to a real change and  
728 development in relation to the regional countries.

729 It is seen that the EU is pursued softer and constructive policies in Middle East politics,  
730 not destructive like the US. The EU has the means to improve its economic and commercial  
731 relations and to ensure its own security, while taking into account its own interests, rather than  
732 changing the borders and locations of the countries or regimes in the region. It is also aimed to  
733 continue to meet energy needs by providing stability to the region. Of course, the recent financial  
734 crisis has prevented the EU from being an effective foreign policy. It is also far from reality to be  
735 able to provide sufficient financial support alone to the countries of the region. The EU is having a  
736 hard time to fully imagine its current policy towards Egypt due to the problems in the region as well  
737 as the incompatibilities it has experienced within itself. One of the most important reasons for this  
738 is the fact that they have different opinions and interests among the members of the Union, and  
739 that the EU wants stability instead of democratization in the region. In other words, the EU, which  
740 is experiencing a democratization-stabilization dilemma, preferred ensuring security in the short-  
741 term regional countries while democratizing and stabilizing the countries in the long run. Of course,  
742 since it is not possible for the authoritarian regimes in the region to internalize and embrace the  
743 concept of democracy without a serious power pushing them, the EU is at the point of producing  
744 and executing foreign policy, transitioning from the idealistic preferences to the real worry in Egypt.  
745 The EU needed to rapidly change the policies and rhetoric against the coup in Egypt. The EU  
746 preferred to ensure its own security and stability in the region instead of turning the authoritarian  
747 regime in Egypt to democracy. Therefore, Islamic radical movements have strengthened, resulting  
748 in an increase in illegal immigration. There is a terrible sense that terrorist structures have begun to  
749 take effect in the world. In order to change this trend, there must be new mechanisms that will  
750 enable Egypt to enter the axis of democratization again, taking into account past experiences. The  
751 unstable situation of the region is a great threat not only to the EU but also to all the rest of the  
752 world. For this reason, it is also wrong to treat only the EU as responsible for resolving the chaos  
753 in the Middle East and push the EU on its own. Already experiencing serious problems, the EU  
754 must provide support to international organizations like the USA, Russia, China and India as well as  
755 the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the  
756 Arab League. In order to evaluate the EU's approach to the Arab Spring process, regarding the  
757 events that took place in the region, each member preferred to implement a policy in line with its  
758 own national interests while remaining inadequate and reluctant to form a common foreign policy.  
759 The MENA region has led to serious divisions among EU members, ranging from illegal  
760 immigration to the fight against terrorism. This diversity has become more evident with the  
761 beginning of the Arab Spring, and the division into military intervention in Libya has started to be  
762 felt seriously. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to say that the European Union is helping  
763 the countries in the MENA region in the transition period of democracy by using various  
764 economic, political and cultural means to protect their national and regional interests because they

765 really want to see democracy in these countries. The EU mainly deals with economic aid in the  
 766 region, the area and groups to which these benefits are transferred. Some financial programs, the  
 767 use of various civil society instruments, have focused on short-term tools. The members link the  
 768 relationship with the countries of the region to a short-term plan rather than a long term one. From  
 769 here it is clear that neither the EU nor its members are far from being a strong global actor in the  
 770 Middle East, preferring to prepare their plans for a maximum of five years, although it is necessary  
 771 to plan for at least 25-30 years so as to become a global power. The European Union's plan for the  
 772 region after a 30-year period seems to be impossible to understand at this stage.

773 The Arab Spring process has resulted in a revolution in Egypt, but since economic  
 774 development has not been achieved and external interventions have continued, instability has  
 775 begun in the country. Although Morsi's domestic and foreign policy is ambitious, Morsi has been  
 776 removed from the administration by powerful military coups because he could not offer solutions  
 777 to internal confusion and economic problems in the country. Subsequently, Egypt entered a new  
 778 process, and the power struggle between the pro-revolutionists and the coup supporters began. As  
 779 a result, even if the developments in Egypt were related to the democratic transition, it was  
 780 frustrating that the political and economic demands of the people of the country were not  
 781 overcome after the Arab Spring. This has also shown that political transformation is not enough for  
 782 such movements to be successful. Political needs must be complemented by economic and social  
 783 needs. The EU has preferred to be more cautious in order to not repeat the mistakes it made in  
 784 Tunisia in the first place to the events in Egypt. Since Egypt is an important country in many  
 785 respects for the EU, the EU has been in favor of keeping the relationship with Egypt in good  
 786 condition in all circumstances while carrying out the policies accordingly. They had good relations  
 787 that EU with Morsi, who succeeded Mubarak's withdrawal, also aimed to establish good relations  
 788 with Sisi too who took the power by a military coup d'état. This policy of EU proved that the EU  
 789 would do its utmost to ensure stability in Egypt, not for democracy.

790

#### 791 4. The Role of the Other Western Countries

792

793 In the process military coup in Egypt, which caused regime changes in the country and failure  
 794 to transition to democracy, the death of thousands of people, Germany did not take a pro-  
 795 interference stance in the first instance as opposed to other European countries. Germany has  
 796 acted with a preference for economic sanctions instead. Germany's Egypt policy also provides  
 797 some clues about the EU's Egypt policy. When the EU's Egypt policy was noticed, it was seen to  
 798 be parallel to each other in general terms. The major reason for this is the fact the EU in the  
 799 German control, which is not in the forefront as a political force in Egypt, is under German  
 800 influence in this respect. Thus, the ineffective Germany in the Egypt and ineffective EU in the  
 801 Egypt equation emerged. Germany had supported the opposition in the face of the events that  
 802 started before the coup in Egypt. As a result, it is possible to see that Germany follows a line in  
 803 support of financial assistance to all countries, mainly against harsh interventions, in view of Egypt  
 804 policy. For this reason, it appears that Germany, which does not stand out as an effective force in  
 805 the military coup in Egypt, has a policy of self-positioning, but not in a very effective position. The  
 806 British administration, which did not show a primal attitude towards the military coup in the  
 807 Egyptian counter-revolution and did not support the pro-democratic opponents, contributed to the  
 808 regional and global legitimacy of the military regime. Following an equidistant politics with the USA  
 809 at the time of the coup in Egypt, England communicated with the Sisi administration immediately  
 810 after the coup and aimed to protect his economic and political interests in the new era. Martin  
 811 (2013) stated that from the statements of William Hague;

812

813 Britain will work with the new regime in Egypt while not supporting military intervention.  
 814 The Foreign Secretary said the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi was a 'dangerous thing' that  
 815 risks setting a precedent in the volatile region. But he said the UK will be forced to work  
 with the army-backed government to protect Britons and British firms in the country. It's



816 of course a dangerous precedent to do that, if one president can be deposed by the military  
 817 then of course, another one can be in the future – that’s a dangerous thing. ‘It’s happened,  
 818 so we have to recognize the situation will move on.’ Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg said  
 819 the Government did not support coups and wanted Egypt to a return to democratic rule as  
 820 soon as possible. He added: ‘We recognize states, not governments. We recognize the state  
 821 of Egypt and we have to work with whoever is in authority in Egypt, we have to do that for  
 822 the safety of British nationals. ‘We have to do that because there are so many British  
 823 companies there. There isn’t really any question of not recognizing a particular government  
 824 (dailymail.co.uk).

825 Similarly, the former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband criticized the British and  
 826 Western governments' silence against the coup in Egypt, emphasizing the intervention against  
 827 20 nocracy as a coup and supporting non-extremist Islamic movements in countries like Egypt.  
 828 Mr. Miliband said: “I think we’ve got to be clear this was a coup.” He added that “the entry of  
 829 Islamist parties – so-called ‘political Islam’ – into the democratic process is a good thing, not a bad  
 830 thing, that political prisoners need to be released, and genuinely democratic politics restarted in  
 831 Egypt” (ft.com). The fact that the administration of Abdulfettah Al-Sisi, who encouraged the  
 832 unresponsive attitude of the Western countries to the coup, carried out massacres in the squares of  
 833 Rabia and Nahda on the 14<sup>th</sup> of August did not change the attitude of the United Kingdom.  
 834 Foreign Minister Hague said he was "saddened by the violence in Egypt and that the killing of the  
 835 protesters was unacceptable. Having no criticism of the military coup d'état and not commenting  
 836 on the killing of thousands of people, Hague made it clear that they should support democratic  
 837 institutions and political dialogue in Egypt. The fact that Britain did not criticize the activities of  
 838 the coup administration in Egypt is an indication that Britain has taken a position against the  
 839 Muslim Brotherhood in the process of counter-revolution, although it did not directly support the  
 840 coup. The most important reason why Britain did not react to the civil liberty abuses and anti-  
 841 democratic implementations of the Egyptian Sisi administration was the economic relations of  
 842 London with Cairo. In order to keep these relations alive, Britain has not reduced its interaction  
 843 with the Sisi administration. Britain has 50% of all foreign investments in Egypt. The economic  
 844 and trade agreements, which are among the biggest foreign investments in Egypt's history, also  
 845 revealed the motivation of Britain's politics in Egypt's counter-revolutionary period, which did not  
 846 react to the human rights violations of the Egyptian military administration in the interest of  
 847 protecting economic interests.

848 To summarize the politics of the British counter-revolutionary period in Egypt, it must  
 849 be said that economic and political interests outweigh democratic values. London, which did not  
 850 want its investments in Egypt to be dangerous, demanded the continuation of the new status quo  
 851 that by not reacting to the civil liberty abuses that followed the coup d'état under the leadership of  
 852 Abdal Fatteh El-Sisi. The UK and its global and regional partners, the US and Israel, followed the  
 853 same policy, facilitating London's work in this process and causing future reactions to remain at a  
 854 lower level due to this policy.

855

## 856 5. Conclusion

857

858 The global actors have always made plans for their interests in the world. They use different  
 859 methods to reach their goals. They can develop detailed roadmap to the target region. The MENA  
 860 region especially Egypt is one of the targeted region for the global actors. Global actors were not in  
 861 favor of the establishment of democracy in Egypt as their own interests might not be met by the  
 862 democratically elected president. Actually, they faintly condemned the dismissal of Morsi, by force  
 863 of military coup, who had come to power with a democratic election. Beside this, they also stated  
 864 that they would be able to do the task for the Al-sisi administration. To sum up, “the European  
 865 Union has not produced serious policies on democratization. There is no effect of Western aid on  
 866 democracy” (Desai 2012:2). There are two reasons for this. First, although the European Union has

867 stated that it gives priority to issues such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, it has in  
 868 fact given priority to issues such as the development of migration, trade and economic relations.  
 869 Therefore, topics like democracy and human rights are lower on the agenda for the European  
 870 Union. On the other hand, there is no perfect harmony between the members of the Union on  
 871 foreign policy production. Disagreements among the Member States prevent the European Union  
 872 from producing a concrete and clear policy. Egypt is important for geostrategic and geopolitical  
 873 aspects for the Western countries, especially the EU. The Israeli-Palestinian problem, radical Islam,  
 874 the fight against terrorism and intense cooperation on trade and energy are the reasons for this  
 875 great importance. For these reasons, the EU has always been in favor of good relations with the  
 876 Egyptian authorities. The EU has progressed in the same way as Egypt on the peace settlement in  
 877 the Middle East while developing Egypt's cooperation in areas such as security, migration, weapons  
 878 of mass destruction and terror after 9/11. There have been disputes between the EU and Egypt for  
 879 some time in the field of human rights, but the EU's misrepresentation of human rights abuses in  
 880 Egypt has hurt the image of the EU. While the EU was criticizing Mubarak for violating human  
 881 rights in Egypt, violations were limited to liberal movements and individuals only. For example,  
 882 while the EU on one side reacted very seriously to the arrest of Eymen Nur and liberal intellectual  
 883 Saadettin Ibrahim, who are among the liberal dissidents of Egypt, they kept silent about the  
 884 arrested members of the MB. The USA was also in the same line with EU owing to their interests  
 885 and security issues.

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