The role of institutions in fiscal discipline: Fiscal rules, budgetary procedures, fiscal agencies<p>Mali disiplinin sağlanmasında kurumların rolü: Mali kurallar, bütçesel prosedürler, mali kuruluşlar
Keywords:
Fiscal discipline, fiscal rules, budgetary procedures, independent fiscal agencies, fiscal councils, Mali disiplin, mali kurallar, bütçesel prosedürler, bağımsız mali kuruluşlar, mali konseylerAbstract
Not only do the principal-agent and common pool problems in public finance cause public resources to be allocated in an inefficient manner, they also lead to fiscal distortions. In order to overcome these issues, a variety of fiscal institutions are recommended in the literature. In this study, the roles that may be undertaken by fiscal rules, budgetary procedures, and fiscal agencies are discussed in light of theoretical/empirical studies and national experiences. Just as the efficiency of fiscal institutions is tied to a country’s budgetary procedures, the success of fiscal councils is tied to fiscal rules. Institutions are not alternatives to each other, but are rather complementary to each other. By ensuring fiscal transparency and implementing an accountability mechanism, fiscal institutions may generate fiscal discipline.
Extended English abstract is in the end of Full Text PDF (TURKISH) file.
Özet
Kamu maliyesinde, asıl-vekil ve ortak havuz problemi, kamu kaynaklarının etkin olmayan şekilde tahsis edilmesine yol açmakta ve mali bozulmalara neden olmaktadır. Literatürde bu sorunların üstesinden gelinmesi için çeşitli mali kurumlar önerilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, mali kurallar, bütçesel prosedürler ve mali kuruluşların mali disiplini sağlamada üstlenebileceği roller, teorik, ampirik çalışmalar ve ülke deneyimleri üzerinden tartışılmıştır. Mali kuralların etkinliği, ülkelerin bütçesel prosedürlerine bağlı olduğu gibi, mali konseylerin başarısı da mali kuralların varlığına bağlıdır. Kurumlar, birbirlerinin alternatifi değil, tamamlayıcısıdır. Mali kurumlar mali şeffaflığı sağlayarak, hesap verebilirlik mekanizmasını işlettiği takdirde mali disiplini sağlamaktadır.
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